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Implementation Science for the Bedside
Elvin H. Geng, M.D., M.P.H.

E

arly in the morning, my intern told the patient that his
kidneys had quit working, that
he was in danger from electrolyte derangements, and that dialysis could save his life. In the
24 hours since his admission to
the hospital, several doctors had
told him similar things. He listened politely, but his answer
was the same: he didn’t want dialysis. “If it’s my time,” he said,
“it’s my time.”
For decades, the man had lived
a stone’s throw from the hospital. Originally from South America, he’d developed diabetes but
never started treatment. High
blood glucose levels are said to
injure our organs like tiny pieces
of glass, making microscopic cuts
in blood vessel walls. Now the
man was 55, and despite his
large, muscular frame, a closer
look revealed clear signs of the
damage. Knobby bones protruded from the backs of his hands,
unearthed by the wasting of muscles. The joints were firm and almost wooden. His internal organs
had sustained similar injuries.
When our team rounded later
that morning, the intern reported,
“Overnight, hyperkalemia to 6.6,
EKG normal, will rewrite for
Kayexalate. He continues to refuse dialysis.” The normal electrocardiography results meant that
immediate death from hyperkalemia was unlikely. Still, we were
at an impasse. Even if we could
temporarily lower the patient’s
potassium level, if we sent him
home with a follow-up appointment and he didn’t show up, he
might die; yet an indefinite period
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of inpatient monitoring without
dialysis was no solution either.
Our only plan was to talk to him
again.
We entered his room. I restarted the discussion, but I fared no
better. After my soliloquy on the
dangers of high potassium, he refused dialysis again. He also ended the conversation, asking me to
respect his desire to rest. I resisted momentarily but chose exit
over escalation. As we continued
rounds, the standard stream of
patient refusals stung a bit more
than usual. An elderly man with
coronary disease refused a transfusion despite having symptomatic
anemia, a woman recovering
from alcoholic hepatitis refused
physical therapy, a young man
with severe cellulitis left against
medical advice. Every refused recommendation was supported by
science, yet patients were unconvinced.
In the afternoon, I scanned
current information on hyperkalemia. Its clinical management
hadn’t changed in the 10-plus
years since my residency. What to
do medically was clear, but the
next steps were not. Googling
“patient refusal,” I found articles
about patients’ right to refuse
treatment and exhortations to respect patient autonomy. Somehow, none of these hit the mark:
we didn’t lack respect for the patient’s wishes, he clearly didn’t
want to die, and yet we were lost,
wandering in the thorny terrain
between a medical condition and
its meaning for the patient’s goals,
mental models, and life.
My research uses perspectives
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from implementation science —
an emerging field that draws on
such disciplines as psychology,
sociology, economics, and marketing to close the widely recognized
gap between evidence-based clinical interventions and their use
in routine care. Although these
perspectives are increasingly discussed in public health, they seem
underused but relevant in one-onone interactions with patients. Coincidentally, earlier that morning,
Richard Thaler had won the Nobel Prize in economics for the insight that people are “predictably
irrational”: our neurobehavioral
decision-making processes are imperfectly aligned with what we
think we want. Extending a scientific lens beyond hyperkalemia
into the behavioral dynamics that
determine use of clinical interventions opened a path forward.
In the team’s afternoon discussion, I skipped the planned talk
on antibiotics and presented a
quick survey of ideas about implementing evidence-based interventions. We discussed newer concepts such as the Consolidated
Framework for Implementation
Research, which offers a framework for mapping diverse approaches to understanding the
implementation process. We also
discussed the older Health Belief
Model, which sees behaviors as
the result of a person’s perceived
susceptibility to a given illness,
the perceived severity of that condition, the perceived benefit of a
potential therapy, and cues to action. We touched on the concept
of “social proof,” which suggests
that when faced with uncertainty,
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people seek guidance from decisions made by people like them
and the consequences of those
decisions. Just as five-star reviews
on Amazon may convince you
that the probable outcome of a
purchase is happiness, the decision to use a medical therapy can
be influenced by observing others
with similar backgrounds and
conditions.
That evening, the intern visited the patient. She sat in a chair
next to the bed, her urgent tasks
completed. The patient told her
that his children were in his home
country, and he hadn’t seen them
for 20 years. His wife also lived
there and they were estranged,
but he hoped they would reconcile someday. When he’d arrived
in the United States, he’d worked
in construction, until a beam fell
and crushed his leg. He lived in a
boarding house with other men
from his country. About the dialysis, he said, “My mother, she had
diabetes, too. The doctor told her
she needed dialysis. She started it,
and 2 months later she died.”
Eight years ago, doctors had told
his sister she should begin dialysis;
she’d refused — and was still alive.
By the next morning’s rounds,
the intern’s analysis had evolved.
“It’s not that he doesn’t think he
has renal failure or that it could
kill him,” she explained. “He just
doesn’t really believe that dialysis
will help him. Our problem is with
his perception of potential benefit.” Furthermore, the patient was
under the impression that once
on dialysis, he’d never be able to
travel, which would end his dream
of returning to his home country
and reconciling with his wife. This
analysis was as much a diagnosis
as hyperkalemia was.

We decided to look into and
confirm the availability of dialysis in his home country, to link
him to those services, and thus
to reframe dialysis for the patient
as a means for achieving his goals.
Since social proof seemed an appropriate part of the prescription,
we would contact the dialysis center seeking a patient, preferably
one with a background like our
patient’s, to talk to him.
Wait, I imagine physicians asking, isn’t this a job for a social worker?
Shouldn’t the doctor simply give patients the facts and let them decide? It’s
not our fault patients make irrational
decisions. Indeed, the renal fellow
had suggested that we “Call psych,
to check out his capacity.” Yet
some of the richest moments in
practice come from exploring the
complicated landscape between
clinical science and a patient’s perceptions, needs, values, and goals.
Capacity and autonomy, though
important, seem inadequate guidance for this journey, because
they fail to account for the complexities of an illness’s meaning
to the patient and for predictable
irrationality. On the other hand,
using our own native emotional
intelligence seems to ignore that
the behavioral drivers of the use
of evidence-based interventions
such as dialysis has increasingly
been rigorously and scientifically
mapped. If health depends as
much on decisions about the use
of treatments as on treatments
themselves, applying insights from
implementation and behavioral
sciences is perhaps no less a doctor’s job than prescribing the
right dose of Kayexalate.
In this case, dissecting “refusal” also changed our relationship with the patient and made
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us better doctors and advocates.
Instead of an “uncooperative” patient with “hyperkalemia from
acute renal failure,” he was someone with “hyperkalemia and acute
renal failure who understands that
he has a severe condition yet
doubts the therapy, because his
life experiences are at odds with
expert advice.” In addition, while
we were focused on treating the
hyperkalemia, he was focused on
reuniting with his family. We were
looking for each other in the
dark. Shining a scientific light
on the problem revealed that being frustrated by his refusal was
as absurd as being frustrated by
hyperkalemia itself.
The next day, the intern reported that the patient had been discharged with an appointment to
have a tunneled catheter placed
and to see her soon as a new primary care outpatient. We’d helped
him take a step forward, but the
journey would be long and uncertain. I hoped he would reach
his goal of reuniting with his
family. We had started by trying
to change the patient’s perspective but found that the real solution was in changing our own.
By doing so, we’d come closer to
the Oslerian ideal of treating not
just the medical condition but the
person with the condition. Today,
doing so is no longer just the art of
medicine, it is the science as well.
Identifying characteristics of the patient
have been changed to protect his privacy.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available at NEJM.org.
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